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The article concerns the issue of constitutional courts’ preliminary references to the CJ.  
So far only a few centralized constitutional courts have accepted raising the preliminary reference 
to the CJ. Three of them are courts which initially had denied such possibility, but later changed 
their minds: Italian Corte Costitutionale (the Italian Constitutional Court; further: ICC); Spanish 
Tribunal Constitucional (the Spanish Constitutional Tribunal, further: SCT) and French Conseil 
Constitutionell (the French Constitutional Council; further: FCC). The first reference addressed  
to the ECJ by ICC came after more than a decade of explicit denial of having the status of a court  
in the meaning of the current Article 267(3) TFUE. The change of the ICC’s position towards  
the preliminary ruling procedure was based on the juxtaposition of two ways in which  
a constitutional review proceeding may be initiated in the Italian legal system: via incidentale and 
via principale. The SCT denied its status as a court in the meaning of Article 267(3) TFUE till 2011. 
The change of the SCT’s position, in contrast to the ICC case was not followed by any in-depth 
argumentation favouring such “judicial volt”. The FCC for the first time referred to the CJ in 2013. 
The profound change in the FCC’s attitude towards EU law was triggered by the introduction  
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I. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
 
The preliminary ruling procedure provided for in Article 267  
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) has  
an immense impact on the harmonious development of EU law and  
the way in which national courts and EU courts interact and communicate. 
The main purpose of the preliminary ruling procedure is to prevent  
the occurrence within the Community of divergences in judicial decisions 
on questions of Community (UE) law, ensuring uniform interpretation  
of EU legal provisions across the 28 Member States. The procedure  
has provided a platform for the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(further: the CJ or ECJ) to deliver seminal judgments that have defined  
the relationship between the national and EU legal systems, among others, 
to develop fundamental principles of EU law, including direct effect, 
indirect effect (i.e. the interpretation of national law in line with directives) 
and primacy1. Therefore, it might be considered as one of the the most 
important aspects of the EU judicial system. 
Under Article 267(2) of the TFUE the national court has discretion  
to refer a case if it considers that a decision on a question of EU law  
is necessary. However under Article 267(3), there is an obligation to refer  
a case concerning a question of EU law by any national court or tribunal 
against whose decision there is no judicial remedy. The broad 
interpretation of the term “court” used in Article 267 TFUE leads  
to the conclusion that a constitutional court may also be considered  
as a court in the meaning of Article 267(3) TFUE2.  
So far only a few centralized constitutional courts have accepted  
the raising of the preliminary reference to the CJEU (Belgian Constitutional 
Court, Austrian Constitutional Court, Lithuanian Constitutional Court, 
Italian Constitutional Court, Spanish Constitutional Tribunal and French 
                                                     
1  A. Norberg, Preliminary Rulings and the Co-operation Between National and European Courts, 
Lund: University of Lund 2006, p. 16. 
2  Further on this issue, see: K. Wójtowicz, Sądy konstytucyjne wobec prawa Unii Europejskiej 
[Constitutional Courts and the European Union Law], Warszawa: Biuro Trybunału 
Konstytucyjnego 2012, p. 129; A. Kustra, Sądy konstytucyjna a procedura prejudycjalna przed 
Trybunałem Sprawiedliwości Unii Europejskiej [Constitutional Courts and the Preliminary Ruling 
Procedure Before the Court of Justice of the European Union], Przegląd Sejmowy [The Sejm 
Review] 2012, issue 4, p. 77. 
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Constitutional Council)3. Three of them are courts which initially denied 
such a possibility, but later changed their mind and entered a preliminary 
ruling procedure. This paper aims to analyze the systemic factors which 
lead constitutional courts to deny their status of a court within the meaning 
of Article 267(3) of the TFUE, to present decisions in which the former 
position towards preliminary procedure was revised and to search  
for reasons that might have favoured change of mind. 
  
II. THE ITALIAN CORTE CONSTITUTIONALE 
 
The first reference addressed to the ECJ by Corte Costituzionale  
(the Italian Constitutional Court; further: ICC) came after more than  
a decade of explicit denial of having the status of a court within  
the meaning of the current Article 267(3) TFUE. For the first time the ICC 
expressed such view in the decision of 29 December 1995 (No. 536/1995)4. 
The case was initiated in via incidentale proceedings. In the course  
of an action brought by Messagero Servizi and Others, challenging an action 
of the Office of Registry imposing mortgage and land registry taxes, as well 
as capital duty, attributable to an increase in the company’s capital  
by means of an acquisition, inter alia, of real estate, the Revenue 
Commission of Padua raised the incidental issue of the constitutional 
legitimacy of certain provisions of Italian tax law from the standpoint  
of Article 76 of the Constitution, to the extent that those provisions failed  
to provide for exemption from duty in such circumstances as were required 
by ECC Directive 69/335 of 17 July 1969 concerning indirect taxes  
on the raising of capital. 
The ICC decided that the case was inadmissible and stated that it was 
not its task to provide an interpretation on Community norms, unless  
it is possible to do so on the basis of “clear evidence” or to resolve 
                                                     
3  Further on this issue, see: Wójtowicz, supra note 2, p. 129; Kustra, supra note 2, p. 77. 
4  See: G. Martinico, Preliminary Reference and Constitutional Courts: Are We in the Mood  
for Dialogue?, Tilsburg Institute of Comparative and Transnational Law Working Paper 2009, 
no. 10, p. 11; electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract+1483664 [last accessed: 
16.12.2013]. Further on the issue of ICC’s previous case-law concerning the preliminary 
ruling procedure, see: M. Dani, Tracking Judicial Dialogue – The Scope for Preliminary Rulings 
from the Italian Constitutional Court, The Jean Monnet Working Paper 2008, no. 10, pp. 5-12, 
electronic copy available at: www.JeanMonnetProgram.org [last accessed: 15.12.2013]. 
162   |   Aleksandra Kustra 
irreconcilable differences in interpretation in relation to those norms.  
The ICC indicated that in such a case it is necessary to refer the matter  
to the ECJ for an interpretation which is binding on all Member States. 
However, it also stated that the preliminary question cannot be referred  
by the ICC, since it essentially exercises the function of a constitutional 
review, ultimately guaranteeing the Observance of the Constitution  
of the Republic by the constitutional organs of the State and the Regions5. 
The ICC claimed that it is impossible to recognized it as a “national 
jurisdiction” within the meaning of the previous Article 177 EC Treaty 
because the differences in the role performed by the ICC, which cannot 
truly be regarded as either an ordinary or a special judicial organ,  
are profound and without precedent in the Italian judicial system. The ICC 
indicated that that fact is well understood and historically established.  
It also claimed that it is for the judge seized of the case, once he has 
identified an issue of constitutional legitimacy based on a conflict between 
a norm of Community law and provisions of national law, in the absence  
of a specific precedent decision on the point by the ECJ, to make a reference 
to the ECJ6. 
The precedent decision in which the ICC changed its mind concerning 
the preliminary procedure, concerned the constitutionality of Articles 2, 3 
and 4 of the Regional Law of Sardinia no. 5 of 11th May 2006, (further  
RL 4/2006) both in the original version and in the version amended  
by the Regional Law of Sardinia no. 2 of 29th May 2007 (further RL 2/2007) 
as well as the constitutionality of RL 2/2007 itself. The challenged 
provisions were part of a wider tax reform promoted by the executive  
of the Sardinia Region and implemented by its regional legislative council. 
The aim of the reform was to create a policy designed to increase the fiscal 
pressure on those activities carried out by non-resident subjects  
on the territory of the Region, that are connected, in principle, with some 
form od economic exploitation of Sardinia’s tourism attractiveness  
                                                     
5  See: K. Doktór-Bindas, Wpływ prawa Unii Europejskiej na system prawa Republiki Włoskiej 
[The Influence of European Union Law on the Legal System of the Republic of Italy], Warszawa: 
Wydawnictwo Sejmowe 2013, pp. 247-248. 
6  See: A. Oppenheimer (ed.), The Relationship Between European Community Law and National 
Law: The Cases, vol. 2, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2003, pp. 379-380. 
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(so called “luxury taxes”)7. Articles 2, 3 and 4 of the RL 4/2006 levied 
several regional taxes, respectively, on the added value of real estate 
properties used as second houses, on second houses used for tourism 
purposes, and on the supply of aircraft and pleasure boat services. Article 5 
of the RL 2/2007 instead provided for a regional residence tax, levied upon 
every person – who is not registered as a resident with the municipal 
register – spending some time in Sardinia during the summer period (from 
15 June to September 15)8. 
The provisions were challenged in via principale by the Italian Council 
of Ministers under multiple standards of review, both constitutional as well 
as regional and international9.  
What is significant for the issue of the preliminary ruling procedure  
is the fact, that Article 4 of the RL 4/2006 was challenged under not only 
constitutional, but also – indirectly – Community law standards.  
The provision set a tax on planes and boats (not including cruise ferries, 
boats used in sports competitions, and boats spending the whole year  
in Sardinia’s harbours). This tax is levied from June 1st to 30th September, 
and its payment was due in the case of each call made in regional airports 
for the purpose of the transport of individuals and yearly by the owner  
of any boat larger then 14 meters who intended to make a call at any 
harbour or mooring point placed on the territory of the Region.  
The Council of Ministers claimed that it violated Article 117 para 1  
of the Constitution in relation to the provisions of the EC Treaty. According 
to the plaintiff, the provision was in conflict with Article 49 EC Treaty 
(regarding freedom of services), Article 81 in connection with Article 3 and 
Article 10 EC Treaty (aimed at protecting competition) and Article 87  
EC Treaty (regarding the prohibition of state aids)10. 
                                                     
7  See: F. Fontanelli, G. Martinico, Cooperative Anatgonists. The Italian Constitutional Court  
and the Preliminary Reference: Are We Dealing With a Turning Point?, Eric Stein Working  
Paper 2008, no. 5, p. 7, electronic copy available at: https://www.ericsteinpapers.eu  
[last accessed: 13.12.2013].  
8  Fontnelli, Martinico, supra note 6, p. 7. 
9  See further on the issue: Z. Witkowski, Ustrój konstytucyjny współczesnych Włoch w aktualnej 
fazie jego przemian 1989-2004 [Constitutional System of Modern Italy in the Stage of Its Changes 
1989-2004], Toruń: TNOiK 2004, p. 385. 
10  Fontanelli, Martinico, supra note 6, p. 8. 
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While the Council of Ministers claimed that the provision  
was unconstitutional since it violates the aforementioned EC Treaty 
provisions, the Region of Sardinia stated that those allegations were 
groundless. In the Region’s view, the right interpretation of the EC Treaty 
provisions makes them compatible with the challenged provision  
of the RL 4/2006. However, the only institution which can assess a binding 
interpretation of the Community (EU) law is the ECJ. Therefore,  
the opinion of the ECJ seemed to be the only decisive element  
for the constitutionality question before the ICC11. 
The ICC faced the problem of whether the primary EU law can be 
invoked as an indirect standard of constitutional review via the application 
of Article 117 para 1 of the Constitution and how it should treat such  
an interposed standard of review in the framework of the proceeding 
initiated in via principale12.  
The change of the ICC’s position towards the preliminary ruling 
procedure was based on the juxtaposition of two ways in which  
the constitutional review proceeding may be initiated in the Italian legal 
system. While the former case-law of the ICC defining its status as a Court 
within the meaning of Article 267(3) TFUE concerned the proceedings 
initiated in via incidentale (by a legal question of a court), the considered 
case was initiated by the Council of Ministers in via principale. The ICC 
claimed that there is a significant difference between the two proceedings. 
The court a quo in via inicidentale proceedings must first verify  
the consistency between the provision of national law and the Community 
law and therefore it is obliged to use the preliminary referral to the ECJ  
if there is any doubt o the interpretation of the Community law). Therefore 
the court a quo shall initiate the constitutional review proceeding only  
if it deems that an incompliance between a national law provision  
and the Italian Constitution exists. On the contrary, in via principale 
proceedings the ICC is the only judicial body involved in the review  
of a domestic provision allegedly in conflict with the UE law. Therefore  
the ICC, when facing a doubt on the EU law interpretation in the case 
                                                     
11  Ibidem.  
12  Doktór-Bindas, supra note 5, p. 241. 
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brought in via principale proceedings, cannot deny its status as a court in the 
meaning of Article 267(3) of the TFUE13.  
In the analyzed case the ICC by order No. 103/2008  
of 13 February 2008 decided to refer to the ECJ 4 preliminary questions:  
1) Is Article 49 EC to be interpreted as precluding the application  
of a rule, such as that laid down in Article 4 of RL No 4/2006, 
under which the regional tax on stopovers for tourist purposes  
by aircraft is levied only on undertakings operating aircraft which 
they use for the transport of persons in the course of “general 
business aviation” activities, which have their tax domicile outside 
the territory of the Region of Sardinia? 
2) Does Article 4 of RL No 4/2006, by providing for the imposition  
of the regional tax on stopovers for tourist purposes by aircraft only  
on undertakings operating aircraft which they use for the transport  
of persons in the course of “general business aviation” activities, 
which have their tax domicile outside the territory of the Region  
of Sardinia, constitute, within the meaning of Article 87 EC, State 
aid to undertakings carrying on the same activities which have 
their tax domicile in the Region of Sardinia? 
3) Is Article 49 EC to be interpreted as precluding the application  
of a rule, such as that laid down in Article 4 of RL 4/2006, under 
which the regional tax on stopovers for tourist purposes  
by recreational craft is levied only on undertakings operating 
recreational craft, which have their tax domicile outside  
the territory of the Region of Sardinia and whose commercial 
operations involve making such craft available to third parties? 
4) Does Article 4 of RL No 4/2006, by providing for the imposition  
of the regional tax on stopovers for tourist purposes by recreational 
craft only on undertakings operating recreational craft, which have 
their tax domicile outside the territory of the Region of Sardinia  
and whose commercial operations consist in making such craft 
available to third parties constitute, within the meaning  
of Article 87 EC, give State aid to undertakings carrying  
                                                     
13  Fontanelli, Martinico, supra note 6, pp. 9-10; Doktór-Bindas, supra note 5, p. 253. 
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on the same activities which have their tax domicile in the Region 
of Sardinia? 
The ECJ ruled in the judgment of 17 November 2009 case C-169/08 that: 
Article 49 EC must be interpreted as precluding tax legislation, 
adopted by a regional authority, such as that provided for under 
Article 4 of RL 4/2006 (Miscellaneous provisions on revenue, 
reclassification of costs, social policy and development) as amended  
by Article 3(3) of RL 2/2007 (Provisions for the preparation  
of the annual and long-term budget of the Region – 2007 Finance Law), 
which establishes a regional tax on stopovers for tourist purposes  
by aircraft used for the private transport of persons, or by recreational 
craft, to be imposed only on natural and legal persons whose tax 
domicile is outside the territory of the region. 
Article 87(1) EC must be interpreted as meaning that tax 
legislation, adopted by a regional authority, which establishes a tax  
on stopovers, such as that at issue in the main proceedings,  
to be imposed only on natural and legal persons whose tax domicile  
is outside the territory of the region, constitutes a State aid measure  
in favour of undertakings established in that territory. 
The ICC took into account the judgment of the ECJ in Case C-169/08 
and in the judgment of 17 June 2010 (No. 216/2010) declared  
the unconstitutionality of the challenged Article 4 of RL 4/2006,  
as amended by Article 3, para. 3 of RL 2/2007. The ICC decided to give  
the judgment a “revival” effect provided for in Article 27  
of the Act of 11 March 1953 on the Functioning of the Constitutional Court. 
Therefore, the challenged provision regained its previous wording. 
There were several factors which had impact on the ICC’s change  
of mind. Not without significance were certainly both the jurisdiction  
of other constitutional courts that had already referred a preliminary 
question as well as “camouflaged” in these decisions Traghetti and Köbler 
pressure from the ECJ, which indicated that the lack of a ruling by the court 
of last instance may result in liability for damages for a Member14.  
Another factor that influenced the shift from the view expressed  
in 1995 was the constitutional reform of 2001 which, inter alia, changed  
                                                     
14  Martinico, supra note 4, pp. 15-16. 
167   |   The First Preliminary Questions to the Court of Justice of the European Union… 
the wording of Article 117 of the Italian constitution. In Italy, since  
the accession to the Communities and until 2001, the only constitutional 
“provision” of an integration function was Article 11. According to it: “Italy 
rejects war as an instrument of aggression against the freedom of other 
peoples and as a means for the settlement of international disputes. Italy 
agrees, on conditions of equality with other States, to the limitations  
of sovereignty that may be necessary to a world order ensuring peace  
and justice among the Nations. Italy promotes and encourages 
international organizations furthering such ends”. On the contrary,  
Article 117, which regulates the division of legislative powers between  
the State and the Regions currently expressis verbis refers to the EU law.  
It states in the first sentence, that “the legislative powers shall be vested  
in the State and the Regions in compliance with the Constitution and with 
the constraints deriving from EU legislation and international obligations”. 
Such wording of Article 117 means that at present it is difficult to conclude 
that EU law is an inadequate standard of review in the constitutional 
review proceedings15.  
It should be emphasized that the ICC has changed its previous attitude 
towards preliminary ruling procedure presenting the shift as the next stage 
of a consistent court’s jurisprudence, and not a revolution in the previous 
case-law. Such approach was possible because of the aforementioned 
juxtaposition of two ways of initiating the constitutional review 
proceedings in the Italian legal system: via principale and via incidentale16. 
  
III. THE SPANISH TRIBUNAL CONSTITUCIONAL 
 
The Spanish Tribunal Constitucional (Constitutional Tribunal; further: 
SCT) denied its status as a court in the meaning of Article 267(3) TFUE  
till 2011. The SCT’s argumentation was rather similar to the ICC’s 
reasoning in the years 1995-2008. The SCT claimed that it is the ordinary 
courts’ task to review the compliance of national legislation with 
Community law standards. Such an attitude also meant that the SCT 
refused to recognize EU law as an adequate standard of review  
                                                     
15  Ibidem, pp. 9-10. 
16  Kustra, supra note 2, p. 90. 
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in constitutional review proceedings. The position was presented widely  
in SCT’s judgment of 13 December 1993, ref. STC 372/199317.  
Unlike the ICC, the SCT did not build its view on the finding that  
it does not meet the characteristics of a court in the meaning  
of Article 267(3) of the TFUE. The position resulted rather from  
the adoption of a secure concept of “separate fields of cognitions”  
of the SCT and the ECJ18.  
The SCT changed its mind in the order of 9 June 2011,  
ref. ATC 86/2011, and referred to CJ three preliminary questions19. 
It should be noted that the change of the SCT’s position, in contrast  
to the ICC case, was not followed by any in-depth argumentation 
favouring such a “judicial volt”20. 
Moreover, the case in which the preliminary questions were referred 
was very similar to a previously decided one: No. STC 199/2009.  
Both – case 199/2009 (ruled in judgment of 28 September 2009) and case 
ATC 86/2011, in which the SCT decided to change its view on preliminary 
ruling procedure, were related to the implementation of the Council 
Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest 
warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States (further: 
EAW Framework Decision) recently amended by Council Framework 
Decision 2009/299/JHA of 26 February 2009 (EAW Amendment 
Frameweork Decision 2009). Both cases concerned the constitutionality  
of the execution of an EAW against a person convicted in absentia  
in another EU Member State. In case STC 199/2009, the Audiencia National 
(Spanish Supreme Court) agreed to the surrender of a British citizen  
to the Romanian authorities on the basis of an EAW, in order to serve  
his four-year prison sentence for the offense of sexual exploitation  
                                                     
17  K. Zaradkiewicz (ed.), Relacje między prawem konstytucyjnym a prawem UE w orzecznictwie 
sądów konstytucyjnych państw Unii Europejskiej [Relationship Between Domestic Constitutional 
Law and EU Law in the Jurisdiction of Constitutional Courts of EU Member States], Warszawa: 
Biuro Trybunału Konstytucyjnego 2011, pp. 94-95. 
18  Kustra, supra note 2, p. 91; Zaradkiewicz (ed.), supra note 17, pp. 94-95. 
19  See: A.T. Pérez, Spanish Constitutional Court, Constitutional Dialogue on the European Arrest 
Warrant: The Spanish Constitutional Court Knocking on Luxembourg’s Door; the Spanish 
Constitutional Court’s Order of 9 June 2011, ATC 86/2011, European Constitutional Law Review 
2012, issue 1, pp. 105-127. 
20  Kustra, supra note 2, p. 92. 
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of minors. Both the proceedings at the court of first instance and on appeal 
in Romania took place in the absence of the accused person. His defense 
was carried out by a lawyer of his choice. The SCT in a judgment  
of 29 September 2009 awarded the applicant partial constitutional 
protection to guarantee his constitutional right to a fair trial and reversed 
the Audiencia Nacional judgment. Concominantly, the SCT held that  
the surrender of the accused person to another Member State  
on the grounds of the EAW deprived him of the possibility of an appeal 
against the sentence. This consequently meant the violation  
of the applicant’s right to a fair trial. The SCT indicated that the presence  
of counsel at the hearing could not be compared with the personal 
attendance of the accused. Therefore, the SCT held that only the physical 
presence of the accused at the trial can fully guarantee their right  
to defense21. 
Case ATC 86/2011 in which the SCT referred for the first time  
to the CJ concerned an Italian citizen – Mr. Melloni – who was convicted  
in Italy in absentia and sentenced to ten years imprisonment for the offense 
of apparent bankruptcy. During the proceedings before the Italian 
authorities Mr. Melloni was represented by two lawyers of his choice.  
On 8 June 2004 the Court of Appeal in Bologna issued the EAW against  
the accused. On 1 August 2008 Mr. Melloni was arrested in Spain.  
On 12 December 2008 the competent Spanish authority – Audiencia  
National – decided to execute the EAW on the detainee and surrender him 
to the Italian authorities. It should be noted that this decision was made 
before the adoption of the abovementioned judgment of SCT in case  
STC 199/2009. Audiencia National found that although the Italian court’s 
judgment was rendered in absentia Mr. Melloni knew about the lawsuit and 
voluntarily chose not to appear in court. In addition, he chose two lawyers 
who defended him. Mr. Melloni filed a constitutional complaint  
to SCT (recurso de amparo). He alleged infringement of the absolute 
requirements deriving from the right to a fair trial proclaimed  
in Article 24(2) of the Spanish constitution. In his submission, the very 
essence of a fair trial had been violated in such a way as to undermine 
human dignity, as a result of allowing surrender to countries which,  
                                                     
21  Martinico, supra note 4, pp. 98-99. 
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in the event of very serious offences, validate findings of guilt made  
in absentia, without making surrender subject to the condition that  
the convicted party is able to challenge them in order to safeguard  
his rights of defence22. 
By order of 18 September 2008, the First Section of the SCT 
acknowledged that the recurso de amparo was admissible and suspended 
enforcement of the order of 12 September 2008. By order of 1 March 2011, 
the Plenary Chamber of the SCT decided, on a proposal from the First 
Section, that it would itself examine the recurso de amparo. 
The SCT pointed out that in the judgment 91/2000 of 30 March 2000  
it recognised that the binding nature of fundamental rights when applied 
“externally” is attenuated, since only the most basic or elementary 
requirements may be linked to Article 24 of the Spanish Constitution and 
give rise to a finding of “indirect” unconstitutionality. Nevertheless,  
a decision of the Spanish judicial authorities to consent to extradition  
to countries which, in cases of very serious offences, allow convictions  
in absentia without making the surrender conditional upon the convicted 
party being able to challenge the same in order to safeguard his rights  
of defence, gives rise to an “indirect” infringement of the requirements 
deriving from the right to a fair trial, in that such a decision undermines  
the essence of a fair trial in a way which affects human dignity23. 
According to the SCT, the difficulty arose from the fact that  
EAW Amendment Framework Decision 2009 repealed Article 5(1)  
of the EAW Framework Decision and introduced therein a new Article 4a. 
Article 4a precludes a refusal to execute the EAW issued for the purpose  
of executing a custodial sentence or a detention order if the person did not 
appear in person at the trial resulting in the decision where the person 
concerned, being aware of the scheduled trial, had given a mandate  
to a legal counsellor, who was either appointed by the person concerned  
or by the State, to defend him or her at the trial, and he or she was indeed 
defended by that counsel at the trial. For the SCT the question therefore 
arose as to whether the current wording of the EAW Framework Decision 
                                                     
22  Pérez, supra note 16, p. 107. 
23  See point 21 of the CJ judgment of 26.02.2013, case C-399/11 Melloni. 
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precludes the Spanish courts from making surrender of Mr Melloni 
conditional on the right to have the conviction in question reviewed24. 
In the light of those considerations, the SCT decided to stay  
the proceedings and to refer the three questions to the CJ for a preliminary 
ruling: 
1) Must Article 4a(1) of the EAW Framework Decision, as inserted  
by the EAW Amendment Framework Decision, be interpreted  
as precluding national judicial authorities, in the circumstances 
specified in that provision, from making the execution of an EAW 
conditional upon the conviction in question being open to review, 
in order to guarantee the rights of defence of the person requested 
under the warrant? 
2) In the event of the first question being answered in the affirmative, 
is Article 4a(1) of an EAW Framework Decision compatible with 
the requirements deriving from the right to an effective judicial 
remedy and to a fair trial, provided for in Article 47 of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights; further: the Charter, and from the rights  
of defence guaranteed under Article 48(2) of the Charter? 
3) In the event of the second question being answered  
in the affirmative, does Article 53 of the Charter, interpreted 
schematically in conjunction with the rights recognised under 
Articles 47 and 48 of the Charter, allow a Member State to make  
the surrender of a person convicted in absentia conditional upon  
the conviction being open to review in the requesting State,  
thus affording those rights a greater level of protection than that 
deriving from EU law, in order to avoid an interpretation which 
restricts or adversely affects a fundamental right recognised  
by the constitution of the first-mentioned Member State? 
As mentioned, the SCT did not provide extensive argumentation 
favouring the change of existing jurisprudence. Nor did the SCT give up 
the concept of separate fields of cognition, which is the essential element  
of the thesis that EU law cannot be recalled as a direct standard of review 
in proceedings before the SCT. This time however, the SCT noticed that 
                                                     
24  See point 23 of the CJ judgment of 26.02.2013, case C-399/11 Melloni. 
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sometimes, even if EU law is not applied directly in the proceedings, it may 
be relevant to the interpretation of constitutional standards of review25.  
A.T. Pérez when analyzing the background of case ATC 86/2011 
indicates several hypothetical factors of the judicial shift in relation  
to preliminary ruling procedure. Firstly, from a systemic point of view,  
the Lisbon Treaty had a certain influence on the modification of the SCT’s 
position. The After-Lisbon Article 4(2) TUE replaced a more modestly 
formulated provision of Article 6(3) of the pre-Lisbon Treaty. The provision 
is now situated between a provision laying down the principle of conferral 
(according to which competences not conferred on the Union  
in the Treaties remain with the Member States) and that laying down  
the principle of sincere cooperation. Currently Article 4(2) TUE explicitly 
stays that: “The Union shall respect the equality of Member States before 
the Treaties as well as their national identities, inherent in their 
fundamental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of regional 
and local self-government. It shall respect their essential State functions, 
including ensuring the territorial integrity of the State, maintaining law  
and order, and safeguarding national security. In particular, national 
security remains the sole responsibility of each Member State”, and the SCT 
stated in the declaration of 1/2004 that the respect for constitutional rights 
and freedoms should be considered as an absolute boundary of the EU 
integration process. On the other hand, Lisbon Treaty abolished  
the previous three-pillar structure of the EU, thus enhancing  
the importance of the EU legislation in the framework of the previous 
second and third pillar. Certainly an important impulse for the considered 
judicial shift was also the amendment of the EAW Framework Decision 
from 2009, which highlighted the already previously perceived conflict 
between the principle of mutual recognition in criminal matters  
and the constitutional guarantees of the right to a fair trial. Perhaps  
the CJ judgments in aforementioned cases Köbler and Tragetti also had  
an impact on SCT’s decision. 
If Mr Melloni’s constitutional complaint was ruled on by the SCT  
in the same way as in the case of 2009, it could cause Spain’s liability  
for breach of the Framework Decision on the EAW. Finally it is quite 
                                                     
25  See: Kustra, supra note 2, p. 94. 
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probable that change in the SCT’s position concerning preliminary ruling 
procedure was also influenced by other factors such as the “good example” 
of other constitutional courts (including the ICC) or the choice of four new 
judges of the SCT26.  
The CJ decided the case Melloni in the judgment of 26 February 2013. 
The CJ held that the right of the accused to appear personally at the hearing 
is an essential component of the right to a fair trial, but this right  
is not absolute. According to the CJ there is no infringement of the right  
to a fair trial, even if the accused did not appear in person, if only  
the person convicted in absentia was aware, in due time, of the scheduled 
trial and was informed that a decision could be handed down if he did not 
appear for the trial or, being aware of the scheduled trial, gave a mandate 
to a legal counsellor to defend him at the trial. The CJ also stressed  
that such an interpretation is consistent with the European Court of Human 
Rights case law concerning the interpretation of Article 6 paragraph 1 and 3 
of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
In answer to the second question the CJ stated that Article 4a(1)(a)  
and (b) of the EAW Framework Decision lays down the circumstances  
in which the person concerned must be deemed to have waived, 
voluntarily and unambiguously, his right to be present at his trial, with  
the result that the execution of a EAW issued for the purposes of executing 
the sentence of a person convicted in absentia cannot be made subject  
to the condition that that person may claim the benefit of a retrial at which 
he is present in the issuing Member State. This is so either where,  
as referred to in Article 4a(1)(a), the person did not appear in person  
at the trial despite having been summoned in person or officially informed 
of the scheduled date and place of the trial or, as referred  
to in Article 4a(1)(b), the person, being aware of the scheduled trial, 
deliberately chose to be represented by legal counsel instead of appearing 
in person. Article 4a(1)(c) and (d) refer to circumstances where  
the executing judicial authority is required to execute the EAW, even 
though the person concerned is entitled to a retrial, because the arrest 
warrant states that the person concerned either did not ask for a retrial  
or that he will be expressly informed of his right to a retrial. 
                                                     
26  Pérez, supra note 16, pp. 121-123. 
174   |   Aleksandra Kustra 
In the light of the foregoing, the CJ ruled that Article 4a(1)  
of the EAW Framework Decision does not disregard either the right  
to an effective judicial remedy and to a fair trial or the rights to the defence 
guaranteed by Articles 47 and 48(2) of the Charter respectively. 
In response to the third question the CJ indicated that by that question 
the national court asked, in essence, whether Article 53 of the Charter must 
be interpreted as allowing the executing Member State to make  
the surrender of a person convicted in absentia conditional upon  
the conviction being open to review in the issuing Member State, in order 
to avoid an adverse effect on the right to a fair trial and the rights  
of the defence guaranteed by its constitution. The CJ stated that such 
an interpretation would give general authorisation to a Member State  
to apply the standard of protection of fundamental rights guaranteed by its 
constitution when that standard is higher than that deriving from  
the Charter and, where necessary, to give it priority over the application  
of provisions of EU law. Such an interpretation would, in particular, allow 
a Member State to make the execution of a European arrest warrant issued 
for the purposes of executing a sentence rendered in absentia subject  
to conditions intended to avoid an interpretation which restricts  
or adversely affects fundamental rights recognised by its constitution, even 
though the application of such conditions is not allowed under Article 4a(1) 
of the EAW Framework Decision. Therefore, the CJ stated that such  
an interpretation of Article 53 of the Charter cannot be accepted. The CJ 
pointed out that such an interpretation of Article 53 of the Charter would 
undermine the principle of the primacy of EU law inasmuch as it would 
allow a Member State to disapply EU legal rules which are fully  
in compliance with the Charter where they infringe the fundamental rights 
guaranteed by that State’s constitution. Consequently, the CJ ruled that 
Article 53 of the Charter must be interpreted as not allowing a Member 
State to make the surrender of a person convicted in absentia conditional 
upon the conviction being open to review in the issuing Member State,  
in order to avoid an adverse effect on the right to a fair trial and the rights 
of the defence guaranteed by its constitution27. 
                                                     
27  See: points 55-64 of the CJ judgment of 26.02.2013, C-399/11 Melloni. 
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The Melloni case clearly shows the rather wide field of probable 
collisions concerning standards of individual rights’ protection guaranteed 
by legal systems of: Member States, EU, and the Council of Europe. The CJ 
judgment in the presented case indicates that even if the national 
constitution provides a higher level of fundamental rights protection  
it is not effective if it precludes the EU law effectiveness in the national 
legal system. Therefore a Member State can not provide a lower standard 
of protection of fundamental rights than the one guaranteed in the Charter 
and the CJ jurisdiction, but even if it provides a higher level, it will  
be effective only if it does not undermine the principle of uniform 
application of UE law28. 
 
IV. THE FRENCH CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL 
 
The French Conseil Constitutionnel (Constitutional Council; further: 
FCC), for the first time referred to the CJ in decision issued on 4 April 2013. 
The FCC requested the CJ’s interpretation in order to properly answer  
a Priority Preliminary Question on Constitutionality (further QPC) filled  
by Cour de Cassation (the Court of Cassation, further: the CC).  
The decision was issued on following factual background.  
On 25 September 2012 the Crown Court at Maidstone issued an EAW 
against Mr Jérémy F. – a United Kingdom national – in connection with 
criminal proceedings brought against him for acts committed in the United 
Kingdom which could be classified in English law as child abduction,  
an offence for which the maximum sentence is seven years’ imprisonment. 
On being stopped and questioned in France on 28 September 2012,  
Mr Jérémy F. expressly stated on that date before the principal  
public prosecutor at the Cour d’appel de Bordeaux that he agreed  
to be surrendered to the judicial authorities of the United Kingdom, 
without, however, waiving the “speciality” principle. According to this 
principle a state wishing to prosecute a surrendered person for offences 
committed before his or her surrender, or extradite a surrendered person  
                                                     
28  See further on the issue: N. de Boer, Addressing Rights Divergences Under the Charter: 
Melloni. Case C-399/11, Stefano Melloni v. Ministerio Fiscal, Judgment of the Court (Grand 
Chamber) of 26 February 2013, nyr., Common Market Law Review 2013, vol. 50, pp. 1083-1104. 
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to a third state, must, subject to certain exception, obtain the permission  
of the executing judicial authority. Such a request is made in the same form 
as an EAW and granted or refused using the same rules which determine 
whether surrender would be granted or refused. The principle  
of “specialty” is intended to ensure that a state cannot seek the surrender  
of a person for an extraditable offence whilst intending to prosecute that 
person for a non-extraditable offence once surrendered, or extradite  
the surrendered person to a third state for an offence which would  
not have been extraditable offence from the original executing state. 
By the judgment of 4 October 2012, the indictment division  
of the Cour d’appel de Bordeaux ordered the surrender of Mr Jérémy F.  
to the judicial authorities of the United Kingdom for the purpose  
of the above-mentioned criminal proceedings. He was surrendered  
on 10 October 2012 and has been in custody in the United Kingdom since 
then. 
 On 22 October 2012 the principal public prosecutor at the Cour d’appel 
de Bordeaux received a request from the judicial authorities of the United 
Kingdom for the consent of the indictment division of that court  
to the prosecution of the applicant in the main proceedings for acts 
committed in the United Kingdom before his surrender which might 
constitute an offence other than that for which he had been 
surrendered. According to the United Kingdom judicial authorities,  
on the return of the girl who was the subject of the alleged abduction,  
she had stated that she had had sexual relations with the applicant  
in the main proceedings in the period from 1 July to 20 September 2012.  
As such acts could be classified in English law as the offence of sexual 
activity with a child under 16, for which the maximum sentence is 14 years’ 
imprisonment, the judicial authorities therefore decided to prosecute him 
for that offence. The request from the United Kingdom judicial authorities 
was on 16 November 2012 embodied in an EAW referring to the offences 
which were the subject of the new prosecution. Following the hearing  
of 18 December 2012, the indictment division of the Cour d’appel  
de Bordeaux decided, by judgment of 15 January 2013, to give consent  
to the request to extend the surrender with a view to new criminal 
proceedings being brought against Mr Jérémy F. for the acts of sexual 
activity with a child under 16 during the above-mentioned period.  
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Mr Jérémy F. appealed to the CC against the judgment of 15 January 2013, 
and the CC referred to the FCC a priority question of constitutionality 
relating to Article 695-46 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, concerning  
in particular the principle of equality before the law and the right  
to an effective judicial remedy29. 
In those circumstances, the FCC decided to stay the proceedings  
and to refer the following question to the CJ for a preliminary ruling: “Must 
Articles 27 and 28 of [the Framework Decision] be interpreted  
as precluding Member States from providing for an appeal suspending 
execution of the decision of the judicial authority which rules, within  
a period of 30 days from receipt of the request, in order either to consent  
to the prosecution, sentencing, or detention with a view to the carrying  
out of a custodial sentence or detention order of a person for an offence 
committed prior to his surrender pursuant to a European arrest warrant, 
other than that for which he was surrendered, or to consent  
to the surrender of a person to a Member State other than the executing 
Member State, pursuant to a European arrest warrant issued for an offence 
committed prior to his surrender?”30. 
 The FCC applied also for a preliminary ruling to be dealt with under 
the urgent procedure pursuant to Article 23a of the Statute of the Court  
of Justice of the European Union and Article 107 of the Court’s Rules  
of Procedure. As reasons for that application, the FCC indicated that both 
the three-month period within which it is required to rule on the priority 
question of constitutionality referred to it and the deprivation of liberty  
to which the applicant in the main proceedings is subject  
in the proceedings in which that question has been raised justify applying 
the urgent preliminary ruling procedure31. 
The CJ granted the application for recognition of the urgency and 
answered the FCC’s preliminary question in the judgment of 30 May 2013, 
Case C-168/13 Jeremy F. against the Prime Minister. The CC ruled that: 
“Articles 27(4) and 28(3)(c) of the EAW Framework Decision, as amended 
                                                     
29  See: points 19-27 of the CJ judgment of 30.05.2013, case C-168/13 Jeremy F v. Prime 
Minister. 
30  See: point 27 of the CJ judgment of 30.05.2013, case C-168/13 Jeremy F. v. Prime Minister. 
31  See: points 28-32 of the CJ judgment of 30.05.2013, case C-168/13, Jeremy F. v. Prime 
Minister. 
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by the Amendment Framework Decision, must be interpreted as not 
precluding Member States from providing for an appeal suspending 
execution of the decision of the judicial authority which rules, within  
30 days from receipt of the request, on giving consent either  
to the prosecution, sentencing or detention with a view to the carrying out 
of a custodial sentence or detention order of a person for an offence 
committed prior to his surrender pursuant to an EAW, other than that  
for which he was surrendered, or to the surrender of a person to a Member 
State other than the executing Member State, pursuant to an EAW issued 
for an offence committed prior to his surrender, provided that the final 
decision is adopted within the time-limits laid down in Article 17  
of the EAW Framework Decision”32. 
The FCC in the judgment of 14 June 2013 took into account  
the interpretation of the EAW Framework Decision adopted in the CJ’s 
judgment. The FCC decided that since the EAW Framework Decision does 
not prevent the submission by the person covered by the EAW appeal 
against a decision extending the scope of the EAW for offenses not covered 
by the original EAW (if it will be processed within 30 days of receipt  
of such request by the judicial authority of another Member State),  
the challenged provision remained within a Member State’s discretion  
in the EAW Framework Decision implementation. In other words,  
the EAW Framework Decision, was not an act which in the case 
determined the diminuition of the constitutional standard of protection  
of individual rights. Hence, the FCC did not see any grounds for exclusion 
of the considered type of decision from the appealing procedure and ruled 
that the challenged provision was unconstitutional.  
When analyzing the motives changes the position of the FCC towards 
preliminary ruling procedure, it should be noted that the FCC  
has traditionally refused to review the compatibility of national law with 
international law, including also and Community law (EU law).  
In a well-known decision regarding the Abortion Act33 the FCC showed 
                                                     
32  See: point 76 of the CJ judgment of 30.05.2013, case C-168/13, Jeremy F. v. Prime Minister. 
33  Ruling No. 74-54, 15.01.1975 (Law on Voluntary Termination of Pregnancy). See further  
on the issue: J.F. Colares, The Reality of EU-Conformity Review in France, College  
of Law Faculty Scholarship 2012, Paper 66, p. 12, electronic copy available at: 
http://surface.syr.edu/lawpub/66 [last accessed: 6.02.2014].  
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that it had no intention of establishing any relationship between domestic 
constitutional law and international law or EU law. The FCC stated that  
“a law violating a treaty does not necessarily violate the Constitution”34. 
Consequently, ensuring the effectiveness of EU law in France  
was the domain of ordinary and administrative courts35.  
The radicalism of the FCC’s view has been softened with the perceived 
need to ensure the proper implementation of Community Directives36.  
In the decision of 10 June 2004 (Act Call No. 2004-496 DC) the FCC 
acknowledged the constitutional value of the obligation to incorporate 
European directives into national law. In the decision of 30 November 2006 
(Act Call No. 2006-543 DC), the FCC went further and claimed that  
a statutory law was clearly incompatible with a Community Directive. 
Formally, such a review is a constitutional review, where the standard  
of review is formed by constitutional provisions concerning  
the international and EU obligations of France. An indirect standard  
of review is however the EU Directive itself37. 
The decisions of 10 June 2004 and 30 November 2006 were first  
steps towards acknowledgement of the EU law as a standard  
in the constitutional review proceedings. Already at this point, the FCC 
could hypothetically refer a preliminary question to the CJ in a case 
concerning the constitutionality of law implementing the EU Directive,  
if there was any doubt as to the interpretation of the Directive. However, 
                                                     
34  Cons. 5 of the FCC judgment. 
35  See further on the issue: O. Pollicino, The Conseil d’Etat and the Relationship Between French 
Internal Law After Arcelor: Has Something Really Changed?, Common Market Law Review 2008, 
vol. 45, p. 1524.  
36  See further on the issue: K. Wójtowicz, Francuski model kontroli konstytucyjności prawa 
krajowego implementującego prawo wspólnotowe [French Model of Judicial Review of Domestic Law 
Implementing the Community Law], [in:] P. Tuleja, M. Florczak-Wątor, S. Kubas (eds), Prawa 
człowieka. Społeczeństwo obywatelskie. Państwo prawa. Księga jubileuszowa dedykowana profesorowi 
Pawłowi Sarneckiemu [Human Rights. Civil Society. Rule of Law. The Anniversary Volume 
Dedicated Professor Paweł Sarnecki], Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Sejmowe 2010, pp. 220-228;  
K. Kubuj, Implementacja prawa wspólnotowego na tle doświadczeń Francji [Implementation  
of Community Law Against French Backdrop], Warszawa: Scholar 2006, p. 88.  
37  Martinico, supra note 4, pp. 73-74; K. Wójtowicz, Glosa do orzeczenia francuskiej Rady 
Konstytucyjnej z dnia 10 czerwca 2004 r. (sygn. 2004-496 DC) [Gloss to the Decision of the French 
Constitutional Council of June 10, 2004 (Act Call No. 2004-496 DC)], Przegląd Sejmowy  
[The Sejm Review] 2005, issue 1, pp. 158-165; K. Wojtyczek, Europeizacja Konstytucji  
V Republiki Francuskiej [Europeanization of the Constitution of the 5th Republic], Przegląd 
Sejmowy [The Sejm Review] 2008, issue 6, p. 148. 
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the FCC still did not recognized itself as the court within the meaning  
of the current Article 267(3) TFEU38. 
Taking this position was definitely associated with the specificity  
of the French paradigm of constitutional review. Until 2008 the FCC’s 
competences were limited to performance of a priori constitutional review 
(reviewing statute laws before their entry into force). Such limitation  
of powers meant that the constitutional review proceedings could  
be initiated only by eligible parties who submitted an application without 
any direct interrelatedness with a concrete case before a court (abstract 
mode of review). Such a constitutional arrangement meant that the FCC’s 
powers were limited in comparison to other centralized constitutional 
courts. The limited scope of cognition enabled the FCC to avoid  
the problematic issue of EU law interpretation.  
Therefore, the significant shift in the FCC’s attitude towards  
EU law – Constitution relationship, was triggered by the introduction  
of QPC procedure in 2008. The constitutional provision that establishes  
a legal basis for this procedure is Article 61(1) of the Constitution,  
which was introduced by Constitutional Law No. 2008-724 of 23 July 2008 
on the modernization of the institutions of the Fifth Republic.  
The aforementioned provision states that: “If, during proceedings  
in progress before a court of law, it is claimed that a legislative provision 
infringes the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution,  
the matter may be referred by the Conseil d’État or by the Cour  
de Cassation to the Constitutional Council which shall rule within  
a determined period. An Institutional Act shall determine the conditions 
for the application of the present article”39.  
                                                     
38  Martinico, supra note 4, pp. 73-74. 
39  See further on the issue: A. Chmielarz, Rada konstytucyjna po zmianach konstytucyjnych  
z lipca 2008 r. [Constitutional Council After Constitutional Amendments of 2008], Przegląd 
Sejmowy [The Sejm Review] 2010, issue 1, p. 135; V. Bernard, M.F.-R. Stéfanini, Reforma 
kontroli konstytucyjności prawa (refleksje na temat projektów artykułów 61-1 i 62 Konstytucji 
przedstawionych przez Komitet Balladura) [The Reform of the Constitutional Review (Reflections  
on the Drafts of Articles 61-1 and 62 of the Constitution Presented by the Balladur Committee], 
Przegląd Sejmowy [The Sejm Review] 2008, issue 6, p. 161; F. Fabbrini, Kelsen in Paris: 
France’s Constitutional Reform and the Introduction of a A Posteriori Constitutional Review  
of Legislation, German Law Journal 2008, issue 10, p. 1297. 
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The introduction of a posteriori constitutional review, which  
is institutionally interrelated to a concrete case pending before a court, 
meant a revolutionary change of the French paradigm of constitutional 
review.  
The “allegation of unconstitutionality” in the QPC may be brought  
by any party to proceedings before the court and it is pre-verified  
by the highest judicial bodies (Council of State and the Court of Cassation). 
Consequently, the matters that are brought before the FCC are usually 
significant and often concern the fundamental problems of constitutional 
rights protection. Therefore the introduction of the QPC proceedings 
reinforced the FCC’s position as an organ of constitutional rights 
protection. The application of the QPC procedure caused that FCC to see 
that the applied interpretation of constitutional rights and freedoms must 
be in compliance with EU law standards.  
  
V. FINAL REMARKS 
 
Significant shifts in the jurisprudence of three constitutional courts 
concerning the application of preliminary ruling procedure show that 
nowadays EU law increasingly becomes a benchmark in the process  
of constitutional adjudication. The constitutional court may refer to EU law 
in order to determine a “demarcation line” which separates the CJ  
and constitutional courts fields of cognition, but it may also apply  
the EU law while interpreting constitutional standards in compliance  
with EU law. International law and EU law standards nowadays heavily 
affect constitutional standards, sometimes determining their modification 
(elevation or diminuition). The presented decisions of ICC, SCT and FCC 
should be considered as parts of a discernible evolution of constitutional 
courts’ approach towards both the constitutional status of EU law  
and the procedural cooperation with the CJ. As D. Sarmiento claimed  
in a comment on one of the recent SCT’s judgments, constitutional courts 
are starting more and more actively to apply EU law, because  
they recognize that “the isolationism doctrine” is not in their interest  
in the long term. Cooperation with the CJ on a procedural niveau helps 
constitutional courts to effectively defend their political position vis-à-vis 
national courts, which sometimes use their “Community mandate”  
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to weaken the constitutional courts’ position40. All three presented cases 




On the 7th of February 2014 German Bundesverfassungsgericht decided  
to use for the first time the preliminary ruling procedure. This salient 
decision means that at present already seven centralized constitutional 
courts have requested the CJ for preliminary ruling. 
 
                                                     
40  D. Sarmiento, Reinforcing the (Domestic) Constitutional Protection of Primacy of EU Law. 
Tribunal Constitutional (Spanish Constitutional Court), Judgment 145/2012 of 2 July 2012,  
Iberdrola v. Commisión Nacional de la Energía, Common Market Law Review 2013, vol. 50,  
p. 890. 
 
 
